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101 
“SOFT IMMUTABILITY” AND “IMPUTED GAY 
IDENTITY”: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
TRANSGENDER AND SEXUAL-ORIENTATION-
BASED ASYLUM LAW 
Joseph Landau∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Owing to a number of recent developments, U.S. asylum law is one of 
the most hospitable legal arenas for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(“LGBT”) litigants.1  Gays and lesbians have been protected as a 
“particular social group” since 1990,2 and it is now beyond cavil that the 
law of asylum protects immigrants who face persecution on account of 
sexual orientation no less than those whose persecution is based on race, 
religion, nationality, or political opinion.3 
 
∗ J.D., 2002, Yale University; B.A., 1995, Duke University.  I am currently a law clerk to 
the Hon. David G. Trager, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.  I would 
like to thank Lavi Soloway, who mentored me on several of the asylum cases discussed in 
this Article; Greg Klass, Frank Pasquale, David Menschel, and Simon Stern, for providing 
insightful comments on drafts of this piece; and Anil Kalhan and Jonathan Fine, former 
colleagues at Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, who supervised my work on Reyes-Reyes 
v. Ashcroft, discussed below. 
 1. Many of the concepts advanced in this Article were useful to me in successfully 
seeking asylum for clients whom I represented pro bono while an associate at Cleary, 
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, from 2002 to 2004. 
 2. Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 820-23 (B.I.A. 1990) (interpreting 
the term “particular social group” to include sexual orientation). 
 3. The asylum statute specifically protects race, religion, nationality, political opinion, 
as well as “particular social groups.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2005).  Homosexuality 
has been consistently recognized as a particular social group since the Toboso-Alfonso 
decision.  After the ruling, former Attorney General Reno declared Toboso-Alfonso 
“precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.”  1895 Op. Att’y Gen. 94 
(1994) (reported at 71 No. 25 Interpreter Releases 859 (July 1, 1994)).  Federal courts of 
appeals have also noted that sexual-orientation-based persecution is fully protected under 
the asylum laws.  See, e.g., Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 721 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(recognizing homosexuality as social group); Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 
1094 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting Acosta 
as established precedent that “gay men and lesbians in Cuba” constitute a particular social 
group). 
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Two recent decisions by the Ninth Circuit4 extend these gains by 
protecting within that jurisdiction many, if not all, male-to-female (“MTF”) 
transgender asylum seekers.5  These cases demonstrate a developing 
jurisprudence of transgender asylum protection based on an asylum 
seeker’s expression of gendered traits, including a person’s hairstyle, 
clothing, demeanor, use of makeup, and choice of names.  In these cases, 
the court honors such expression as a true and honest depiction of identity 
and self-determination, extending protection to litigants because the traits 
they exhibit are integral to their identities. 
These cases evidence a “soft immutability” standard that, while 
requiring the asylum seeker to prove a “fundamental” transgender identity, 
allows a more relaxed set of criteria that adjust to the context of the 
particular asylum seeker’s case and circumstances.  The conception of 
identity advanced in these cases eschews a standard biological approach of 
protecting only innate characteristics like chromosomal makeup, internal 
sex organs, or “birth sex” (the gender assigned to an individual at birth), 
extending protection based on characteristics adopted over timeincluding 
behaviors, character traits, and forms of dress. 
In addition to taking advantage of this developing case law, transgender 
asylum seekers can marshal at least two additional arguments on their 
behalf.  First, they can assert that they qualify under prevailing definitions 
of “particular social group”; second, they can assert a claim based on an 
“imputed gay identity.”6  Under the “imputed gay identity theory,” 
individuals who do not identify as gay or lesbian but who are labeled and 
persecuted as such can still litigate an asylum claim based on sexual 
orientation.  Transgender applicants, for example, who do not identify as 
gay, but who are nevertheless perceived by those around them as gay, can 
take advantage of this theory.  The imputed gay identity is not limited to 
LGBT asylum seekers; heterosexuals can bring (and have brought) such 
claims as well.7 
This Article surveys the law of LGBT asylum as it has developed over 
the past fifteen years, first, with the landmark case of Matter of Toboso-
 
 4. Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2004); Hernandez-Montiel, 225 
F.3d at 1084. 
 5. The decisions do not currently protect female-to-male (“FTM”) transgender persons, 
though the theory of protection on which these decisions rely should be available to all 
transgender persons.  See infra Part III. 
 6. I have found both strategies instrumental in my own representation of transgender 
asylum seekers; as discussed below, litigants in all jurisdictions can avail themselves of 
these strategies. 
 7. See Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 719, discussed infra note 112. 
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Alfonso, which recognized homosexuality as a “particular social group”; 
second, with the Ninth Circuit’s recent cases adopting a soft immutability 
standard of identity and expanding asylum protection to transgender 
individuals; and third, with a discussion of the “particular social group” 
analysis as it applies to transgender asylum seekers and the emergence of 
the “imputed gay identity” category as an alternative basis for relief for 
those litigants who do not identify as gay or lesbian but who nonetheless 
face anti-gay or anti-lesbian persecution. 
Given the staggering number of new asylum claims making their way 
through the various courts of appeals,8 one can expect more developments 
in the near future.  These changes, while crucial to asylum litigators and 
commentators on immigration law, can also contribute to the development 
of LGBT law and scholarship in other statutory and constitutional contexts 
like employment discrimination and constitutional equal protection 
challenges.9 
 
 8. Since 2002, the number of immigration appeals lodged in federal courts has surged.  
During the twelve month period ending in March 2003, filings of immigration agency 
appeals rose 379% to 8446 appeals.  See Immigration Appeals Surge in Courts, 35 THIRD 
BRANCH: NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 9 (Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts, Washington, D.C.), Sept., 2003, available at  
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/sep03ttb/immigration/index.html.  The unprecedented increase 
in immigration appeals is a result of procedural reforms initiated by former Attorney 
General John Ashcroft that were intended to clear a backlog of roughly 56,000 immigration-
related cases.  Id.; see Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 
54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002).  The reforms expand the use of a streamlining procedure first 
implemented in 1999, whereby immigration appeals are decided not by a panel of arbiters 
but rather by a single individual who upon reviewing the decision can issue a one-sentence 
summary affirmance without any analysis of the underlying merits of the case.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(e)(4) (2005); see generally Marcia Coyle, Immigration Appeals Surge: A Backlog 
Shifts From One Level to the Circuit Courts, 26 NAT’L L.J. 9 (2003).  This procedure, 
dubbed “affirmance without opinion” has caused immigration cases to move from 
administrative courts to the federal courts of appeals, which have jurisdiction over appeals 
of final agency decisions.  See generally id.  The procedure has been upheld by all federal 
circuits where it has been challenged.  See, e.g., Dominguez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 678, 680 
(8th Cir. 2003); Falcon-Carriche v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2003), reh’g 
denied en banc, 350 F.3d 845, 856 (2003); Khattak v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 
2003); El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195,  205-06 (1st Cir. 2003); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 
328 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2003); Mendoza v. United States Attorney Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 
1288-89 (11th Cir. 2003); Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 831-33 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 9. See Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need To Include Transgender 
Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 
404-05 (2001) (noting application of the analysis of these casesparticularly Hernandez-
Montielto claims involving “employment discrimination, domestic violence and rape, and 
violations of equal protection”). 
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I. THE STRUCTURE OF ASYLUM LAW 
“Asylum” is a legal remedy available to legal and illegal immigrants 
who seek protection from persecution they faced or would face in their 
home country on account of some protected ground.10  Not all immigrants 
are protected from persecution; rather, the persecution must have a 
connection to some protected characteristic.  Currently, that includes race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, and membership in a “particular 
social group.”11  An asylum request is automatically considered an 
application for an alternative claim of withholding of removal.12  Both 
 
 10. U.S. asylum law is based on the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, and the 1967 Protocol Relating to The Status of Refugees.  See 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 303 U.N.T.S. 268.  
Although the U.S. Congress never ratified the Convention, it joined the Protocol in 1969.  
The Refugee Act of 1980, amending the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C § 
1101(a)(42)(A) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)), adopts the Convention’s definition of refugee and 
the Protocol.  See Pub. L. No. 96-212, 201, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980). 
 11. Immigration & Nationalization Act of 1956 § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(A) (2005). 
 12. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b); Njuguna v. Aschroft, 374 F.3d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Every 
asylum application is deemed to include a request for a withholding of removal.”).  Almost 
all litigants also seek relief under the Convention Against Torture.  The Convention Against 
Torture, which provides a remedy similar to that granted under withholding of removal, is 
vital for individuals who, for some reason, do not fall into one of the protected groups 
(including “particular social group”) under the asylum and withholding of removal statutes. 
  Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture prohibits signatory states from 
deporting individuals to states where there are “substantial grounds for believing” they 
would be subjected to torture.  U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, art. 3, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  The Convention Against Torture defines 
“torture” as: 
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.  It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions. 
Id. art. 1(1). 
  In 1998, the United States implemented the Convention Against Torture by enacting 
the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. G, 112 Stat. 
2681-761, § 2242, and in February 1999, the Attorney General published regulations 
governing claims under the Convention Against Torture.  See 64 Fed. Reg. 8479 (codified at 
8 C.F.R. § 208.16-208.18).  An applicant seeking Convention Against Torture relief must 
demonstrate he will “more likely than not” be tortured upon return to his country of origin.  
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forms of relief require the applicant to demonstrate a certain quantum of 
persecution that the individual suffered in his or her home country or would 
suffer if returned there, and both require a “nexus” between that 
persecution and one of the protected grounds mentioned above.13 
A.   Asylum Versus Withholding of Removal 
Asylum and withholding of removal appear nearly identical but have 
important differences: asylum is subject to the Attorney General’s 
discretion,14 while withholding of removal, once proven, is a mandatory 
form of relief.15  A person granted asylum may be eligible for permanent 
residency;16 consequently, most litigants prefer asylum.  Withholding of 
removal, by contrast, guarantees only that the person will not be forcibly 
returned to his or her country of origin and does not preclude the possibility 
of being removed to a third country.17 
1. Asylum 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1956,18 an alien may be 
granted asylum if, at the discretion of the Attorney General, the alien is a 
“refugee” within the meaning of the statute.19  A “refugee” is 
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . 
and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
 
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).  This standard tracks the higher burden of proof required in 
withholding of removal cases.  Cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).  At 
the same time, the applicant need not demonstrate that he would be tortured along any of the 
protected grounds specified in asylum and withholding of removal cases.  See, e.g., 
Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001).  Convention Against Torture relief 
is therefore available to any alien who meets the burden of proof.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c).  
Because the Convention Against Torture lacks any nexus requirement, the identity of the 
individual bringing the claim is a less salient (though still relevant) issue. 
 13. See generally INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-83 (1992); Ontunez-Tursios 
v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2002) (“‘on account of’ language . . . requires the 
alien to prove some nexus between the persecution and the five protected grounds”). 
 14. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2005). 
 15. Id. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c). 
 16. See id. § 1255 (2005). 
 17. See id. § 208.16(f). 
 18. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 19. Immigration & Nationalization Act of 1956 § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). 
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opinion.20 
An applicant may establish eligibility by proving past persecution, which 
creates a rebuttable presumption that a well-founded fear exists,21 or by 
demonstrating a “reasonable possibility” of future persecution.22  An 
applicant who belongs to a particular social group can meet this standard if 
she can establish that in her country of origin, there is a pattern or practice 
of persecuting a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant.23 
2. Withholding of Removal 
An applicant qualifies for mandatory withholding of removal when he 
demonstrates that his life or freedom would be threatened upon return to 
his homeland on account of his membership in a particular social group.24  
To establish eligibility for withholding of removal25 the applicant faces a 
somewhat higher burdenhe must demonstrate that future persecution is 
“more likely than not” to occur.26  Thus, an applicant can obtain 
withholding by proving that he belongs to a particular social group and that 
it is more likely than not that he would be persecuted on account of his 
membership in that group if returned to his country of origin.27 
Consequently, in order to bring a successful claim for asylum or 
withholding of removal, an applicant must first establish participation in 
one of the statutorily or judicially created categories; in the case of LGBT 
persons, the individual must prove membership in a “particular social 
group.”  Upon doing so, the applicant must demonstrate the nexus between 
that particular social group and persecution. 
 
 20. Immigration & Nationalization Act of 1956 § 101(a) (42) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(A). 
 21. Under the Attorney General’s implementing regulations, past persecution or torture 
creates a presumption that the applicant’s life or freedom is threatened in the country of 
removal.  The government may refute this claim by establishing to a preponderance of the 
evidence that (a) there has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the 
applicant’s life or freedom would not be threatened, or (b) the applicant could avoid a future 
threat by relocating to another part of the proposed country.  8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1) (2005). 
 22. See, e.g., Reyes-Guerrero v. INS, 192 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 8 
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)). 
 23. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2)(i). 
 24. Id. § 208.16(b). 
 25. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). 
 26. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987). 
 27. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). 
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3. Proving “Social Group” Standards 
The Immigration and Nationality Act does not define “particular social 
group,”  leaving interpretation to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”)the highest administrative body for interpreting and applying 
immigration laws28and the federal courts.  In Matter of Acosta, the BIA 
defined “particular social group” as “a group of persons all of whom share 
a common immutable characteristic.  The shared characteristic might be an 
innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it 
might be a shared experience . . . .”29  The characteristic must be something 
“the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required 
to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or 
consciences.”30 
Many federal circuits borrow the Acosta definition of “particular social 
group,” while other circuits have developed slightly alternative 
formulations.  The First,31 Third,32 and Seventh33 Circuits explicitly follow 
the Acosta analysis, which defines “particular social group” through the 
lens of innate and immutable characteristics.  The Second and Ninth 
Circuits have developed variations on the standard BIA definition that are 
arguably broader than the Acosta formulation.34 
In Gomez v. INS, the Second Circuit defined “particular social group” as 
one “comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental 
characteristic in common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a 
persecutor . . . or in the eyes of the outside world in general.”35  This 
standard expands upon the Acosta analysis in two ways.  First, it protects 
characteristics that are not innate and immutable, but “fundamental”a 
category that potentially incorporates a broader range of characteristics.  
Second, by focusing on the persecutor’s perception, the Gomez formulation 
recognizes the extent to which outsiders’ perceptions of an individualreal 
or imaginaryform the basis of that person’s persecution.  Gomez captures 
an important reality underlying much persecution (not to mention 
 
 28. A description of the BIA and its functions is available at 
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm. 
 29. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 30. Id.; see also In re H, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342 (B.I.A. 1996) (citing Acosta, 19 I. & 
N. Dec. at 233-34). 
 31. See, e.g., Meguenine v. INS, 139 F.3d 25, 28 n.2 (1st Cir. 1998); Ananeh-Firempong 
v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 32. See, e.g., Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 171 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 33. See, e.g., Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 34. See infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text. 
 35. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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discrimination): namely, that actual identity is often less relevant than 
presumed identity.36  After Gomez, asylum seekers in the Second Circuit do 
not have to prove actual membership in one of the protected groups; rather, 
they need only demonstrate that they face persecution because outsiders 
presume that they are members of such a group.  This definition of 
particular social group overlaps with a larger principle of asylum law 
discussed belowthe theory of “imputed” identity.37 
The Ninth Circuit for many years applied a test for particular social 
group that was at once broader and narrower than the BIA’s Acosta 
analysis.  In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, the court defined particular social 
group as “a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are 
actuated by some common impulse or interest.”38  Sanchez-Trujillo’s 
“central concern is the existence of a voluntary associational relationship 
among the purported members, which imparts some common characteristic 
that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that discrete social 
group.”39  The court also noted that the term particular social group was 
intended to apply to a  “cohesive, homogeneous group.”40 
Sanchez-Trujillo’s “voluntary associational relationship” requirement 
seemed to add a second hurdle to the Acosta analysis, which focused 
merely on the individual’s identity.41  At the same time, however, Sanchez-
 
 36. A number of state anti-discrimination measures and hate-crimes statutes recognize 
the importance of protecting individuals on the basis of presumed sexual identity.  See, e.g., 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7 (2004) (hate crime statute designating “all persons . . . free from any 
violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property 
because of . . . sexual orientation . . . or because another person perceives them to have one 
or more of those characteristics”).  The drafters of the Employment Non-Discrimination 
Act, federal legislation that would outlaw sexual orientation discrimination in the 
workplace, incorporated this standard into the framework of the Act.  The bill defines 
“sexual orientation” as “homosexuality, bisexuality, or heterosexuality, whether the 
orientation is real or perceived.”  H.R. 3285(a)(9), 108th Cong. (2003). 
  A few states also protect various forms of transgender identity.  See, e.g., MINN. 
STAT. § 363.03(44) (2004) (defining sexual orientation as including, inter alia, “having a 
self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or 
femaleness”); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-24-2.1, 28-5-6, 34-37-3 (2002) (defining “gender 
identity,” for purposes of public accommodations, equal housing, and employment acts, 
respectively, as “gender-related self image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related 
expression, whether or not that gender identity, gender-related self-image, gender-related 
appearance, or gender-related expression is different from that traditionally associated with 
the person’s sex at birth”). 
 37. See infra Part III.B. 
 38. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1577. 
 41. Sanchez-Trujillo confused commentators and litigants, who saw the formulation as 
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Trujillo’s willingness to protect “common characteristic[s] . . . fundamental 
to . . . identity,”42 like the Second Circuit’s standard, presented a potential 
departure from Acosta’s strict immutability analysis and indicated a 
willingness to protect aspects of identity that are not necessarily immutable, 
but still integral, to identity. 
The Ninth Circuit harmonized Sanchez-Trujillo with the Acosta analysis 
in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS,43 expanding the definition of “particular 
social group” to include “one united by a voluntary association . . . or by an 
innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences 
of its members that members cannot or should not be required to change 
it.”44  This test incorporated an Acosta-like appreciation of “innate 
characteristics” and characteristics that a person “cannot or should not be 
required to change,” while retaining Sanchez-Trujillo’s protection for 
various “fundamental” identities. 
II. LGBT ASYLUM CLAIMS 
The law of asylum clearly protects lesbians and gay men from 
persecution by extending the particular social group doctrine to sexual 
orientation claims.  The state of the law is less certain with respect to 
transgender persons, but a number of doctrinal trends signal a growing 
willingness to protect asylum seekers from persecution based on their 
transgender identity. 
A. Homosexuality 
Gays and lesbians have constituted a particular social group since 
1990.45  In Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, the BIA upheld a ruling by an 
immigration judge (“IJ”) granting particular social group status to gay men 
 
unduly restrictive.  See, e.g., T. David Parish, Note, Membership in a Particular Social 
Group Under the Refugee Act of 1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of the 
Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 941-42 (1992) (noting the “flawed” and “tenuous” nature 
of Sanchez-Trujillo due to its overly restrictive interpretation of the particular-social-group 
doctrine). 
 42. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576 (emphasis added). 
 43. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 44. Id. at 1093 (emphasis in original).  In many ways, the court merely incorporated the 
idea in Sanchez-Trujillo that a social group can be comprised of a voluntary association of 
individuals; beyond that, the court essentially eliminated Sanchez-Trujillo’s requirements 
that members of the purported social group be “homogenous” or “cohes[ive].” 
 45. Before 1990, the INS issued per se exclusions of gay and lesbian immigrants, 
designating them excludable because of their presumed psychopathic personalities.  See 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 155-56 (3d ed. 2003). 
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in Cuba.46  After this decision, doubt surfaced as to whether Toboso-
Alfonso was limited to only those sexual orientation claims filed on behalf 
of Cubans.47  In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno resolved the question 
by extending Toboso-Alfonso to all sexual orientation claims, ordering it 
“precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.”48  The 
Attorney General held that “an individual who has been identified as a 
homosexual and persecuted by his or her government for that reason alone 
may be eligible for relief under the refugee laws on the basis of persecution 
because of membership in a particular social group.”49  Since the Toboso-
Alfonso ruling, a number of judicial circuits have noted that gays and 
lesbians may bring asylum claims as members of a particular social 
group.50 
B. Transgender Identity 
The BIA has not formally recognized transgender status as a particular 
social group.  And no federal circuit has yet squarely considered the issue.  
But the Ninth Circuit has issued a pair of decisions that extend protection to 
many transgender asylum seekers.  Hernandez-Montiel establishes the 
particular social group “gay men with female sexual identities,”51 a broadly 
defined group encompassing a variety of gender-based characteristics, 
including dress, comportment, and hairstyle.  In Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 
the court reiterated this principle by again extending protection to a 
transgender asylum seeker and again incorporating a vast array of gender-
 
 46. Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990). 
 47. The government continued to try to limit the reach of Toboso-Alfonso by arguing 
that the case applied only to the particular social group of gay men living in Cuba.  Some 
courts of appeals similarly describe Toboso-Alfonso as establishing a particular social group 
of “homosexuals in Cuba.”  See Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 547 (6th Cir. 
2003); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 48. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 819 n.1; see also 1895 Op. Att’y Gen. 94 (1994) 
(reported at 71 No. 25 Interpreter Releases 859, 859 (July 1, 1994)).  
 49. 1895 Op. Att’y Gen. 94 (1994) (reported at 71 No. 25 Interpreter Releases 859, 860 
(July 1, 1994)).  By protecting those individuals who have been “identified” as gay or 
lesbian, the Attorney General essentially incorporated the Second Circuit’s observation in 
Gomez on the role of the persecutor’s perception of the asylum seeker.  See supra notes 35-
36 and accompanying text. 
 50. See, e.g., Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 547 (noting Acosta as established 
precedent that “homosexuals in Cuba” constitute a particular social group); Amanfi v. 
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 721 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing homosexuality as social group); 
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Lwin, 144 F.3d at 
511 n.3 (recognizing that “gay men and lesbians in Cuba” constitute a particular social 
group). 
 51. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1087. 
Deleted: LANDAUCHRISTENSEN.EDIT.D
OC
Deleted: 3/20/2005
Deleted: 3/17/2005
Deleted: 5:05 PM
Deleted: 3:10 PM
278873-TEXT.NATIVE.1325881553.DOC 1/6/2012  12:26:31 PM 
2005] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ASYLUM LAW  111 
 
based characteristics.52  These cases signal a consensus in the Ninth Circuit 
that those who deviate from established gender norms deserve no less 
protection than those who are gay or lesbian.  The cases also highlight a 
greater respect for the manifold ways in which transgender identity is 
expressed. 
1. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS 
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit issued a sweeping decision that extended 
protection to Geovanni Hernandez-Montiel, a transgender asylum seeker.53  
Hernandez-Montiel was a Mexican immigrant who realized same-sex 
attraction from a young age and began dressing and behaving as a woman 
at the age of twelve.54  He wore his hair long and had long fingernails, 
dressed in feminine clothing, and took female hormones.55  Based on these 
characteristics, he argued that he should be considered a member of the 
particular social group “gay men with female sexual identities.”56 
At his asylum hearing before an IJ, Hernandez-Montiel provided expert 
testimony describing the ostracism and persecution of gay men who are 
perceived to take on a feminine role during sexual intercourse.  This 
testimony noted that gay men who appear feminine are more easily 
identified and uniquely subjected to especially harsh forms of persecution 
by police.57  The IJ, finding Hernandez-Montiel entirely credible and 
sincere, nevertheless denied relief because “homosexual males who wish to 
dress as a woman” did not constitute a particular social group.58  The IJ 
noted that Hernandez-Montiel alternated between dressing in male and 
female attire and because of that found that “he cannot characterize his 
assumed female persona as immutable or fundamental to his identity.”59  
 
 52. Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 784-85 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 53. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1087. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1088. 
 56. Id. at 1089.  The decision to argue to the court that Hernandez-Montiel was a gay 
man with a female sexual identity made strategic sense.  After all, if gay men already 
constituted a particular social group, then a subset of that group, “gay men with female 
sexual identities,” would, a fortiori, qualify for protection as well.  Hernandez-Montiel also 
argued that he was a member of the particular social group of transsexuals, but the Ninth 
Circuit chose not to rule on the issue of whether transsexuals constitute a particular social 
group.  See id. at 1095 n.7 (“In addition to being a gay man with a female sexual identity, 
Geovanni’s brief states that he ‘may be considered a transsexual.’ . . . We need not consider 
in this case whether transsexuals constitute a particular social group.”). 
 57. Id. at 1088-90. 
 58. Id. at 1089. 
 59. Id. 
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The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, ruling that Hernandez-Montiel faced 
persecution not because of homosexuality but “because of the way he 
dressed (as a male prostitute)” and that “his decision to dress as a female” 
was not an immutable characteristic.60 
The Ninth Circuit reversed.  The court began by noting that gays and 
lesbians are members of a particular social group.61  The court built upon 
this foundation by noting that “[s]exual identity goes beyond sexual 
conduct and manifests itself outwardly, often through dress and 
appearance.”62  The court observed that certain men who are homosexual 
by definition “outwardly manifest their identities through characteristics 
traditionally associated with women, such as feminine dress, long hair and 
fingernails.”63  In certain cultures, these men face the most serious 
persecution because they “are perceived to assume the stereotypical 
‘female,’ i.e., passive role in gay relationships.”64  The court coined the 
phrase “gay men with female sexual identities” to describe Hernandez-
Montiel and other similarly situated asylum seekers.65  And, to the great 
benefit of future asylum seekers, the court eschewed any clear-cut 
definition, standard, or litmus test for membership in this social group, 
essentially trusting an individual’s self-definition as a true and accurate 
reflection of gender identity. 
The court recognized that Hernandez-Montiel was “a homosexual who 
has taken on a primarily ‘female’ sexual role,” that his homosexuality was 
manifest from a very young age, that he began dressing as a woman at the 
age of twelve, socialized with other gay youngsters at school, and dressed 
in female attire on a regular basis.66  Noting these factors, the court rejected 
the IJ’s and BIA’s descriptions of Hernandez-Montiel as a man who 
occasionally engaged in cross-dressing: “This case is about sexual identity, 
not fashion . . . . Geovanni manifests his sexual orientation by adopting 
gendered traits characteristically associated with women.”67 
 
 60. Id. at 1089-90. 
 61. Id. at 1094 (citing, inter alia, Toboso-Alfonso and Matter of Tenorio, No. A72-093-
558 (B.I.A. 1999) (per curiam) (adopting IJ decision granting asylum to Brazilian gay man 
whose asylum claim qualified “on account of one of the five grounds enumerated” in the 
INA)). 
 62. Id. at 1093. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1095. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1096. 
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2. Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft 
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit expanded the contours of “gay men with 
female sexual identities” in the case of another transgender asylum seeker, 
Luis Reyes-Reyes.68  The court again reiterated its commitment to the 
group “gay men with female sexual identities” and noted its application to 
a person who “dresses and looks like a woman, wear[s] makeup and a 
woman’s hairstyle.”69  The court also noted Reyes-Reyes’s 
“characteristically female appearance, mannerisms, and gestures,” “deep 
female identity,” and use of monikers “such as Josephine, Linda, and 
Cukita.”70  Throughout the briefing, counsel referred to Reyes-Reyes as 
“transgender,” providing the court with an opportunity to incorporate that 
concept into its broader definition of “gay men with female sexual 
identities.”71  The court abstained from referring to Reyes-Reyes as 
transgender.  It did, however, note that Reyes-Reyes’s “sexual orientation, 
for which he was targeted, and his transsexual behavior are intimately 
connected.”72  While this statement does not ensure protection for all forms 
of transgender identity, it does suggest a greater willingness to protect 
various forms of “transsexual behavior”either by biological males or 
femalesthat are linked to sexual orientation.  It accords with the 
important recognition in Hernandez-Montiel that “[s]exual identity goes 
 
 68. I represented Reyes-Reyes in his petition for review before the Ninth Circuit and 
argued the case before the panel.  I relied heavily on Hernandez-Montiel in briefing the 
social group issue and the nexus between social group and persecution.  The dispositive 
issue at the heart of the Reyes-Reyes case was not social group, but rather the IJ’s incorrect 
application of legal standards under the withholding of removal statute and the Convention 
Against Torture.  The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the agency in light of both issues.  
See Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 787-89 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 69. Id. at 785. 
 70. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71. Before briefing the issues, I discussed the matter of transgender identity at great 
length with my client.  Reyes-Reyes does identify as transgender, and it seemed appropriate 
to refer to the client as such throughout the briefing (and during oral argument).  And given 
that neither the Government nor the IJ ever challenged Reyes-Reyes’s fit within the 
particular social group “gay men with female sexual identities,” I was able to rely on Reyes-
Reyes’s uncontested membership in a previously established particular social group all the 
while suggesting to the panel that it could address the issue of transgender identity more 
broadly.  Rather than briefing the issue of transgender identity as such, I simply referred to 
Reyes-Reyes throughout the brief as both “transgender” and as a “gay man with a female 
sexual identity” in an attempt to guide the panel toward incorporating a broader form of 
transgender identity protection in its ruling.  In its published opinion, the court eschewed the 
word “transgender” but did note “that Reyes’s [sic] sexual orientation, for which he was 
targeted, and his transsexual behavior are intimately connected.”  Id. at 785 n.1; see infra 
note 79 and accompanying text. 
 72. Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 785 n.1. 
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beyond sexual conduct and manifests itself outwardly, often through dress 
and appearance.”73  Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-Reyes, taken together, 
establish strong precedent for future transgender asylum seekers appearing 
before administrative and federal courts.74  By extending protection to 
various forms of gender expression as an outgrowth of sexual orientation, 
the Ninth Circuit has opened up the possibility for additional transgender 
asylum seekersFTM or MTFto pursue their claims.75  Indeed, not a 
single judge on either panel dissented.76 
3. Implications 
Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-Reyes embrace a “soft immutability” 
standard that signals a positive shift in the way courts protect transgender 
asylum seekers.  This soft immutability standard reduces the need for 
scientific or biological proof through static characteristics by way of 
chromosomal makeup, sex organs, or the sexual identity assigned at birth; 
rather, transgender asylum seekers can seek protection based on traits 
adopted over time and later deemed integral to identity.  Although the cases 
do not dispense with the immutability requirement entirely, as evidenced 
by the use of terms like “innate,” “fundamental,” and of course, 
“immutable,” they show remarkable flexibility in terms of what can 
constitute an immutable trait.  The courts eschew a biological definition of 
immutability and embrace non-biological forms of identity, providing 
litigants with a wider range of choices.  Relevant considerations may 
include the duration of the person’s identification with a particular gender, 
the frequency of the asylum seeker’s performance of that identity, and the 
individuals with whom the asylum seeker socializes on a regular basis. 
The court’s reliance on some type of immutability standard should not 
be surprising; after all, every jurisdiction, to some degree, retains 
immutability as the basis of determining a particular social group.  But 
 
 73. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 74. According to Taylor Flynn, because the Hernandez-Montiel court based its decision 
“in large part on Geovanni’s persecution due to gender nonconformity, it seems likely that 
under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, transsexuals would constitute a particular social group 
for asylum purposes.”  See Flynn, supra note 9, at 405 n.76. 
 75. This is, indeed, all the more remarkable given the resistance by many federal courts 
to extend statutory provisions barring sex discrimination to aspects of gender performance.  
See, e.g., id. at 396 (noting refusal by many courts to extend Title VII protection beyond 
anatomical sex to include gender); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 917 (2002) 
(same). 
 76. In Reyes-Reyes, Judge Jay Bybee issued a separate opinion concurring and 
concurring in the judgment.  384 F.3d at 789. 
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Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-Reyes advance beyond a strict interpretation 
of what immutability means.  The Hernandez-Montiel court notes, for 
instance, that “[s]exual identity goes beyond sexual conduct and manifests 
itself outwardly, often through dress and appearance,”77 and that the 
petitioner “manifests his sexual orientation by adopting gendered traits 
characteristically associated with women.”78  The Reyes-Reyes court 
equally notes that “Reyes’s [sic] sexual orientation, for which he was 
targeted, and his transsexual behavior are intimately connected.”79  Both 
cases protect these identities through the ways they are expressed, and 
neither case relies on a scientific account to buttress its holding.  In short, 
individuals can establish identity through traits that accurately and fairly 
represent their identities.  This developing law lives up to the promise of 
the original definition of particular social group, which protects aspects of 
identity that a person “cannot change, or should not be required to change 
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”80 
With respect to their views of identity, the Hernandez-Montiel and 
Reyes-Reyes cases encompass what Professor Kenji Yoshino calls 
“performative” identity.81  As Professor Yoshino notes, courts generally 
protect only those traits believed to be immutable (like chromosomes or sex 
organs) and generally refuse to extend protection to aspects of identity that 
can apparently be altered to conform to normative standards,82 even when 
the courts grasp their own power to extend protection to various 
 
 77. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093. 
 78. Id. at 1095. 
 79. Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 785 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 80. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 81. Professor Kenji Yoshino details the “performative” theory of identity and its 
relationship to equal protection jurisprudence in comprehensive and illuminating detail in 
Covering.  See generally Yoshino, supra note 75, at 779, 865.  Professor Yoshino observes 
the myriad ways that courts refuse to extend protection to characteristics or expression they 
do not consider essential to identity.  Id. at 771.  Instead, courts expect litigants to assimilate 
to one normative standard, or “cover” those aspects of identity not linked to innate 
characteristics like chromosomes.  Id. at 849-64. 
  The asylum law cases discussed above dovetail with a peformative conception of 
identity: that is, rather than seek to isolate a status like race or sexor, here, sexual 
orientation and gender identityand define it according to immutable characteristics like 
chromosomes or sex organs, the courts actually look at the person’s acts to determine their 
fit within a particular identity.  This accords with Yoshino’s discussion of a “weak 
performative model,” which “suggests that identity has a performative aspect, such that 
one’s identity will be formed in part through one’s acts and social situation, rather than 
being entirely guaranteed by some prediscursive substrate.”  Id. at 871. 
 82. Id. at 890 (discussing Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(limiting its conception of race to characteristics that one could not change like skin color 
and bloodlines)). 
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performative identities.83  Under such a model, an individual’s identity is 
constituted, at least in part, by his or her actions, not immutable 
characteristics beyond that person’s control.84  These Ninth Circuit cases 
follow precisely this logic by extending protection to various statuses not 
according to a fixed, innate quality but rather by virtue of the way those 
statuses are acted out, or performed, protecting gender practices that not 
only “describe, but actually create, our sex.”85  By protecting the 
transgender asylum seeker’s comportment, dress, grooming, and 
assumption of transgender names, the courts have begun to embrace this 
performative conception, signaling a dramatic and more accommodating 
shift in its jurisprudence. 
These cases not only extend protection to performative dimensions of 
identity, but also eschew the “reductive and normalizing account of illness, 
disability, or genetics” observed by Anna Kirkland as underlying most 
cases involving transgender litigants.86  Kirkland notes Hernandez-
Montiel’s “rhetorical distancing from any essentialist understanding of 
what it would mean to be a member of Hernandez-Montiel’s persecuted 
social group.”87  Hernandez-Montiel therefore presents an “entirely new set 
of possibilities . . . including protection for many meaningful practices of 
the self that are not ‘immutable.’”88  The Ninth Circuit provided broad 
guidelines wherein transgender individuals’ gender expression is something 
“worth protecting, not because it cannot be changed, but because it is a 
meaningful and worthy part of being that particular person.”89  At the same 
 
 83. Id. at 897 (discussing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355-72 (1991) 
(plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.) (refusing to consider one’s spoken language as a 
peformative characteristic of race but noting in dicta that language could constitute a proxy 
for race because, “for certain ethnic groups and in some communities . . . proficiency in a 
particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal 
protection analysis”)). 
 84. See id. at 871. 
 85. Id. at 870. 
 86. Anna Kirkland, Victorious Transsexuals in the Courtroom: A Challenge for 
Feminist Legal Theory, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 31 (2003). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 32.  While I agree that the courts begin to distance themselves from an 
essentialist understanding, I think it may be an overstatement to suggest that the courts 
dispense with the immutability requirement altogether.  As mentioned above, see supra note 
81, the courts do not so much eliminate the immutability standard as broadenin a 
performative directionwhat can be considered as an immutable trait.  And, as I explain 
below, see infra note 100 and accompanying text, litigants should continue to assume the 
prevalence of a more rigid immutability standard in order to ensure that their clients have 
the best chance of success. 
 89. See Kirkland, supra note 86, at 32. 
Deleted: LANDAUCHRISTENSEN.EDIT.D
OC
Deleted: 3/20/2005
Deleted: 3/17/2005
Deleted: 5:05 PM
Deleted: 3:10 PM
278873-TEXT.NATIVE.1325881553.DOC 1/6/2012  12:26:31 PM 
2005] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ASYLUM LAW  117 
 
time, the cases refuse “to characterize such identities as nonessential and 
behavior-based.”90 
These asylum law developments dovetail with LGBT victories in other 
contexts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas,91 which outlawed all remaining laws prohibiting adult sodomy and 
explicitly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick.92  The Lawrence Court extended 
protection to lesbians and gay men not on account of their homosexual 
status but rather by recognizingand protectingsame-sex behavior as an 
aspect of identity: 
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.  The State 
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their 
private sexual conduct a crime.  Their right to liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct 
without intervention of the government.93 
As far as the law of asylum is concerned, Lawrence ends a period of 
uncertainty that dogged LGBT asylum litigation for more than a decade.  
Before the Court invalidated Bowers, courts could return asylum seekers to 
countries with anti-sodomy laws on their books, no matter how severe.94  
Courts engaged in this slight of hand by essentially eliding the distinction 
 
 90. Flynn, supra note 9, at 408. 
 91. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 92. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 93. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  Justice O’Connor, concurring separately in Lawrence, 
noted that the statute’s proscription of various forms of conduct was tantamount to status-
based discrimination because “the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely 
correlated with being homosexual.”  Id. at 583. O’Connor’s logicthat protecting 
homosexual conduct is necessary to ward off invidious discrimination “toward gay people 
as a class,”is essentially peformative in nature because it protects identity not only in its 
static dimensions but though its manifestations, namely, same-sex sodomy.  Id.; see 
Yoshino, supra note 75, at 778, 842, 865, 872, 873 (noting the covering demand of 
abstaining from same-sex sodomy and reasoning that under a performative model, “[g]ay 
status can at times . . . be experienced as constituted by homosexual sodomy . . . .”). 
 94. See, e.g., Matter of Abdul-Karim, No. A72-661-821 (I.J., San Diego, Cal., June 11, 
1998) (returning to Lebanon an asylum seeker who “testified credibly that he is a 
homosexual male” and ruling, in light of Bowers, that Lebanon’s “anti-sodomy laws are not 
persecution”).  The Ninth Circuit denied a petition to review the agency’s decision in Abdul-
Karim, citing substantial evidence for the agency’s ruling.  Abdul-Karim v. Ashcroft, 102 
Fed. Appx. 613, 613 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 
819, 824 (B.I.A. 1990) (Vacca, Board Member, dissenting) (“The United States Supreme 
Court has in fact found that state criminal sodomy laws do not violate the fundamental 
rights of homosexuals.”).  Government attorneys opposing asylum applications would even 
argue that the very possibility of U.S.-based asylum for gays and lesbians was contradicted 
by the presence within the territory of state anti-sodomy laws. 
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between illegitimate persecution and legitimate prosecution.95  The 
overruling of Bowers eliminates this possibility.96 
III. LITIGATION STRATEGIES 
Unless and until the BIA or the federal circuits extend protection to all 
asylum seekers, litigators and academics must continue to operate on 
 
 95. See id.  Lawrence obviates the need to collapse all sexual-orientation-based 
persecution (and, outside the asylum law context, discrimination) as status-based.  For 
example, I represented a transgender asylum seeker from Lebanon, a country where sodomy 
is a criminal offense, in New York immigration court in 2003, before Bowers was overruled.  
Article 534 of the Lebanese Penal Code criminalizes “all physical contact and union[s] 
against nature.”  Under the circumstances, I argued in moving papers that my then-client’s 
persecution stemmed not from her conduct but her status, and that she would face 
persecution in Lebanon regardless of whatever sexual activity she chose (or chose not) to 
engage in.  This was essentially illegitimate persecution, not legitimate prosecution under 
Lebanon’s anti-sodomy law.  The presence of Bowers made arguments like this necessary.  
See infra note 94 (discussing Abdul-Karim). 
 96. The court’s oblique stance on the precise contours of this “full right” to engage in 
private sexual behavior has enabled some lower courts to dilute much, if not all, of the 
otherwise robust and protective rhetoric in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. 
  Immediately after deciding Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered a Kansas 
Appellate Court to reconsider a 2002 decision in which it upheld a seventeen year prison 
sentence for an eighteen-year-old boy who committed one act of consensual oral sex with 
another boy four years his junior.  Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955, 955 (2003).  The Kansas 
Appellate Court initially relied heavily on Bowers, and the U.S. Supreme Court issued an 
order granting certiorari, vacating judgment, and remanding the case to the lower court in 
light of its Lawrence opinion.  Id.  On January 30, 2004, the Kansas Appellate Court 
reaffirmed its 2002 decision, ruling that “Limon is not asserting a Lawrence-like due 
process challenge.  Instead, Limon makes an equal protection challenge . . .  [and] the law 
and facts are distinguishable from Lawrence.”  State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 235 (Kan. App. 
2004).  Moreover, “the Lawrence court refused to hold that homosexuality was 
constitutionally irrelevant and deserving of strict scrutiny review.”  Id. at 239.  The case is 
currently on appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court.  State v. Limon, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 284 
(2004).  
  The same week that the Kansas Appellate Court reaffirmed its Limon decision, the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld Florida’s law barring gay men and lesbians from adopting children.  
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th Cir. 
2004), rehearing denied by Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 
F.3d 1275, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).  The Eleventh Circuit denied that Lawrence 
required overturning the Florida law.  While Lawrence “establish[ed] a greater respect than 
previously existed in the law for the right of consenting adults to engage in private sexual 
conduct,” id. at 815-19, the Supreme Court never “characterize[d] this right as 
‘fundamental.’”  Id. at 816.  In short, the lower court refused “to infer a new fundamental 
liberty interest from an opinion whose language and reasoning are inconsistent with 
standard fundamental rights analysis.” Id. at 817.  The lower court even chastised the 
Supreme Court for issuing a ruling that invoked principles “not with ‘careful description,’ 
but with sweeping generality.” Id.  The U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari.  
125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).  See also Joseph Landau, Misjudged, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 9, 2004, at 
16 (discussing the Limon and Lofton cases in light of Lawrence). 
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several fronts.  First, litigators in the Ninth Circuitwhich hears roughly 
half of all immigration appeals97should obviously marshal Hernandez-
Montiel and Reyes-Reyes for their doctrinal and rhetorical import.  As 
mentioned above, these cases protect MTF transgender persons and 
recognize the ways that identity is shaped by one’s gender performance.  
The soft immutability standard espoused in these cases embraces a 
performative logic that promotes broader interpretations of the “particular 
social group” doctrine.  Litigators bringing cases outside the Ninth Circuit 
should still cite Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-Reyes, even though these 
cases may have less weight outside that jurisdiction. 
Asylum seekers (in all circuits) have additional options as well.  First, 
litigators should focus on the definition of “particular social group” within 
their particular jurisdiction and note the ways in which transgender identity 
satisfies that standard.  After applying the language of “particular social 
group,” litigators should consider inquiring into the nature of the 
persecution against their clients in order to determine whether that 
persecution is on account of the transgender individual’s perceived 
homosexuality.  If that is the case, a claim based on imputed gay identity 
should be advanced as well. 
A. Particular Social Group 
As an initial matter, the process of bringing a successful asylum claim 
requires arguing that transgender persons constitute a particular social 
group.  Then, of course, the applicant must prove that she or he is 
persecuted because of membership in that group.98  Transgender identity 
should qualify under any of the above-mentioned definitions of “particular 
social group” because it is in many, if not most, cases a fundamental aspect 
of one’s identity and usually something that the individual does not want to 
and/or does not feel he or she can change, even in the face of persecution 
back home.  Such an argument satisfies the definitional requirements of 
“particular social group” established by the BIA and the federal circuits.  
At the same time, it accords with the idea that “the social group concept . . . 
is a flexible one, designed to anticipate varied forms of invidious 
 
 97. In 2003, 47.6% of all immigration appeals were filed in the Ninth Circuit, 
representing one in every three new appeals docketed in that court.  See Claire Cooper & 
Emily Bazar, Immigration Appeals Swamp Federal Courts, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 5, 
2004, at A1.  According to Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Mary Schroeder, 872 immigration 
appeals were filed in her court in all of 2000; during the first six months of 2004, that 
number had already grown to 2900 cases.  Id. 
 98. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. 
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persecution against aggregations of humanity.”99 
As a starting point, it might be helpful to note that sexual orientation 
constitutes a particular social group and to advance this precedent to help 
establish that transgender identity is a protected group as well.  Although 
many jurisdictions are beginning to apply the soft immutability standard 
discussed above to the definition of “particular social group,” litigators, in 
an abundance of caution, might nevertheless see reason to champion 
rhetoric sounding in strict immutability in defining their clients.100  
Litigants might even want to revert back to a biological or quasi-biological 
conception of immutability by arguing that a person’s transgender status is 
“fixed,” noting, perhaps, that the individual has consistently (perhaps from 
an early age) identified with a gender other than the one assigned at birth 
and that the person has not altered his or her transgender status in the face 
of persecution and intense pressure to change (perhaps by family and 
friends).101  The litigator should introduce any additional evidence that will 
help demonstrate the “fundamental” nature of the client’s transgender 
identity.102  This might include a discussion, where applicable, of a client’s 
use of hormones to enhance male or female appearance, and/or the decision 
to undergo various surgical procedures.103  One might then argue that the 
client’s identity is in any event something that she should not be required to 
change.  Hernandez-Montiel is helpful here with its formulation that 
“sexual identity is immutable because it is inherent in . . . identity; in any 
event, [one] should not be required to change it,”104 as is language from 
Matter of Acosta defining those traits worthy of protection as those a 
person “either cannot change, or should not be required to change . . . .”105  
Lawrence is additionally helpful given its discussion of intimate sexual 
activity as a protected constitutional right; indeed, its language respecting 
 
 99. Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group As a 
Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 67 (1983). 
 100. As the court in Hernandez-Montiel noted, “Sexual orientation and sexual identity are 
immutable; they are so fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be required to 
abandon them.”  Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 101. See id. at 1095 (“[Petitioner’s] female sexual identity must be fundamental, or [s]he 
would not have suffered this persecution and would have changed years ago.”). 
 102. Cf. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (noting that the 
characteristic must be “fundamental to [particular-social-group members’] individual 
identities or consciences”). 
 103. Examples include a thyroid chondroplasty (“Adam’s apple” removal surgery, in the 
case of a male-to-female individual), cosmetic surgery to render appearance more masculine 
or feminine, or the decision (or plans) to undergo sex reassignment surgery. 
 104. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1087. 
 105. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
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the privacy of individuals, combined with the connections drawn by 
Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-Reyes between sexual orientation and 
gender identity, can be extended to transgender persons as well. 
In addition to focusing on the individual’s identity, litigators should also 
note the ways that transgender persons are treated differently than, or 
singled out from, other sexual minorities.  Effeminate men and masculine 
women are often persecuted with extreme harshness, even in countries that 
are apparently tolerant of homosexuality.  With respect to Latin American 
countries, the Ninth Circuit observed in Hernandez-Montiel that “[a] 
male . . . who is perceived to assume the stereotypical ‘female,’ i.e., 
passive, role in . . . sexual relationships is ‘ostracized from the very 
beginning and is subject to persecution, gay bashing as we would call it, 
and certainly police abuse.’”106  Where applicable, litigators might want to 
note the prevalent persecution of transgender persons, which remains even 
in the absence of persecution against gay men and lesbians.  This further 
demarcates the distinctive harms facing transgender persons and the 
“shared experience” among members of this particular social group.107 
The argument that transgender persons constitute a particular social 
group has persuasive appeal.  But, not all judges will agree.  Many will 
flatly rule that transgender identity is simply not protected under the 
asylum and withholding of removal statutes, or that transgender persons 
cannot satisfy the immutability requirement within the various parameters 
set by that jurisdiction’s definition of “particular social group.”  At that 
point, litigators should consider an additional argument available for many 
transgender asylum seekers: the doctrine of “imputed gay identity.” 
B. Imputed Gay Identity 
Under imputed identity, courts look not to the asylum seeker’s identity 
but the persecutor’s perceptions and motivations behind the persecution.  If 
the persecutor perceives an individual to be a member of a particular social 
group and persecutes her on that basis, the applicant’s actual identity is 
irrelevantall that matters is the persecutors’ beliefs. 
Advancing the imputed gay identity theory has the advantage of placing 
transgender asylum seekers into a category of persons already deemed 
eligible for “particular social group” status as opposed to having to 
 
 106. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1089. 
 107. Cf. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232-33 (noting persecution of “people in a certain 
relation, or having a certain degree of similarity, to one another or people of like class or 
kindred interests”). 
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persuade a factfinder that transgender persons organically constitute a 
particular social group.  Imputed identity is most commonly found in cases 
of political opinion,108 but it is not limited to those cases.109  Courts have 
repeatedly interpreted the term “particular social group” to include sexual 
orientation and imputed sexual orientation, and the Second Circuit 
incorporates imputed identity into its very definition of particular social 
group.110  The Third Circuit has explicitly noted the breadth of the imputed 
identity doctrine, extending it to sexual-orientation-based claims.  In 
Amanfi v. Ashcroft,111 the court reversed a BIA decision holding that the 
imputed identity doctrine was limited to political opinion.112  The court 
held that imputed gay identity falls squarely under the BIA’s decision in In 
re S-P-,113 a case in which the BIA extended asylum to an applicant who 
faced persecution on account of his imputed political views.  In S-P-, the 
BIA ruled that “[p]ersecution for ‘imputed’ grounds (e.g., where one is 
erroneously thought to hold particular political opinions or mistakenly 
believed to be a member of a religious sect) can satisfy the ‘refugee’ 
definition.”114  In relying on that holding, as well as a proposed Attorney 
General regulation in 2000 that would extend the imputed identity doctrine 
to all protected groups across the board, 115 the Amanfi court recognized the 
 
 108. See generally DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 325-30 
(1999). 
 109. The BIA has tried on at least one occasionunsuccessfullyto confine the doctrine 
exclusively to cases of political opinion.  The Third Circuit rejected that attempt in Amanfi 
v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003), and explicitly recognized the imputed gay identity 
standard.  See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
 111. 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 112. Amanfi involved a claim by a purportedly heterosexual man who, in believing he 
had been selected to be sacrificed by “macho men” in his native Ghana, engaged in 
homosexual activity so as to render himself impure for sacrifice.  He then sought asylum on 
the basis that he would be persecuted in Ghana not because he would be sacrificed but rather 
on account of his perceived homosexuality.  The BIA flatly denied this claim, finding no 
legal precedent supporting an individual who was not himself homosexual to qualify for 
relief under extending precedents protecting gays and lesbians.  See id. at 721-24. 
 113. Id. at 721 (citing In re S-P-, 21 I. &. N. Dec. 486 (B.I.A. 1996) and In re T-M-B-, 21 
I. & N. Dec. 775 (B.I.A. 1997)). 
 114. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 489. 
 115. The text of the proposed regulation is as follows: 
An asylum applicant must establish that the persecutor acted, or that there is a 
reasonable possibility that the persecutor would act, against the applicant on 
account of the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion, or on account of what the persecutor perceives 
to be the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion. 
65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76597-98 (Dec. 7, 2000) (proposed rule 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b)) 
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doctrine of imputed gay identity. 
The imputed identity doctrine has been noted by additional federal 
circuits and the BIA,116 and is also implicitly covered by the Second 
Circuit’s definition of “social group,” which protects individuals who are 
persecuted because of characteristics “which serve[] to distinguish them in 
the eyes of a persecutor . . . or in the eyes of the outside world in 
general.”117  The imputed gay identity theory is also explicitly part of the 
law of sexual-orientation-based asylum as established by former Attorney 
General Reno’s 1993 order making Toboso-Alfonso precedent in all cases 
in which “an individual who has been identified as a homosexual and 
persecuted by his or her government for that reason alone.”118  Reno’s 
order establishes and the Third Circuit’s Amanfi decision extends the 
availability of the imputed gay identity theory as an alternate basis for 
establishing social group status for transgender asylum claims. 
The imputed gay identity doctrine relies on a few rather simple, basic 
observations.  First, many cultures, including our own, place great 
emphasis on the accord between a person’s outward appearance and his or 
her biological sex.  Individuals who deviate from these expectations are 
more readily identifiable and at greater risk of stigmatization.  Effeminate 
men and masculine women are frequently branded (accurately or 
inaccurately) gay or lesbian and are targeted on the basis of their presumed 
homosexuality.  Indeed, because “[e]ffeminate men and masculine women 
are often assumed to be homosexual” and because of the widely held view 
that “to be gender atypical is to be orientation atypical and vice-versa,”119 
transgender persons who are persecuted because of their perceived 
deviation from gender expectations, and for whom persecution can be as 
much a gender-based phenomenon as a sexual-orientation-based one, may 
be able to bring a claim under the imputed identity doctrine.120  Litigants 
 
(emphasis added).  The court also noted the Attorney General’s intention to “codif[y] the 
existing doctrine of imputed political opinion, as well as the existing administrative 
interpretation that this doctrine also extends to the protected grounds other than political 
opinion.”  65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76592 (Dec. 7, 2000). 
 116. Many courts have recognized S-P- as standing for the proposition that imputed 
political identity is a recognized basis for seeking asylum.  See, e.g., Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 
F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004); Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 760 (1st Cir. 1992); In re 
T-M-B-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 777 . 
 117. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 119. Yoshino, supra note 75, at 844. 
 120. As noted in Hernandez-Montiel, effeminate gay men in particular are singled out for 
persecution because they are “perceived to assume the stereotypical ‘female,’ i.e., passive, 
role in gay relationships.”  Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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bringing claims for such clients should highlight the way their clients are 
marked by their male or female characteristics and the unique ways that 
their client’s culture places such emphasis on the accord between a 
person’s outward appearance and his or her given sex.121 
Litigators bringing these claims on behalf of transgender asylum seekers 
may want to emphasize, where applicable, the types of epithets that are 
hurled against their clients.  Many persecutors use slang terminology for 
transgender persons synonymous with derogatory terms like “fag” or 
“dyke,” demonstrating that, from the persecutor’s perspective, transgender 
identity and homosexual identity are synonymous.  The nexus between 
persecution and the protected ground can be established when these 
epithets accompany the injurious acts themselves.  Litigants are generally 
in the best position to explain this situation to their attorneys, and counsel 
may also want to interview experts, who can provide a broader 
understanding of general country conditions and the way those conditions 
impact LGBT persons.  In many instances, an expert might also note that a 
particular country has no concept of “transgender,” resulting in the 
perception that all gender-non-conforming behavior is synonymous with 
homosexuality.  Experts can also provide important insight into collateral 
country conditions to bolster the particular kinds of persecution at stake.122 
 
 121. Hernandez-Montiel and Reyes-Reyes pay important attention to the ways that sexual 
orientation and gender interrelate in culture, but there are cases in which IJs have used this 
same observation as a way to deny asylum to worthwhile candidates.  In particular, one IJ 
recently refused to grant asylum to an individual whose homosexuality was apparently not 
manifested through gendered traits (at least not in the eyes of this particular IJ).  In Matter of 
Soto Vega, No. A 95 880 786 (IJ, L.A., Cal., Jan. 21, 2003), the IJ noted the credibility of a 
gay man who feared being returned to Mexico, but denied him relief because of the asylum 
seeker’s apparent non-“obvious” gay demeanor.  See Brief for Appellant at 4, Soto Vega v. 
Ashcroft (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-70868), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-
data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/319.pdf.  The judge noted that most people would not be able to 
see that the respondent is gay, id. at 48, and that “if he returned to Mexico in some other 
community [than the one in which he was raised] it would not be obvious that he would be 
homosexual unless he made that obvious himself.”  Id at 39.  This ruling, in addition to 
patently denying certain gay individuals the protection of the law guaranteed by the cases 
discussed in this Article, assumes that a person’s homosexuality is manifested only through 
outward traits and behavior and that gay men who can “cover” their sexual orientation 
should be denied protection under the asylum laws.  See id. at 39-42.  On January 27, 2004, 
the BIA affirmed without opinion the IJ’s decision.  Id. at 3.  The case is now on appeal in 
the Ninth Circuit.  See Bob Egelko, Gay Group Appeals Asylum Ruling: Guadalajara Police 
Beat Mexican Man, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 27, 2004, at B-3.  Immigration authorities in other 
countries have reached similar decisions.  See, e.g., Refugee Told He’s Too Masculine, CHI. 
SUN-TIMES, May 5, 2004, at 45 (discussing case of Fernando Enrique Rivera, a Mexican 
man denied asylum by Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board because he was not 
“visibly effeminate”). 
 122. Because, for instance, many LGBT asylum seekers face persecution by members of 
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Under the theory of imputed gay identity, transgender asylum seekers 
need not self-identify as gay or lesbian to gain protection; rather, they need 
only demonstrate that they are perceived to be so by their persecutors.  And 
many transgender litigants, who understandably prefer not to identify as 
gay or lesbian, might possess a stronger legal claim under the imputed gay 
 
their own families, it is often vital to document the extent (or lack thereof) to which police 
or other government agents respond to intra-family disputes.  In many countries, acts of 
intra-family violenceno matter how brutalgo completely uninvestigated and 
unredressed.  Although generalized persecution by private (i.e., non-government) actors is 
not necessarily actionable under the asylum laws, government sanctioning of private 
persecution can give rise to a cognizable asylum claim.  See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 
1097 (granting relief to applicant suffering persecution “‘inflicted either by the government 
or by persons or organizations which the government is unable or unwilling to control’”) 
(quoting Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997)); Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17 
F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (reversing BIA and granting asylum because the “statute protects 
against persecution not only by government forces but also by nongovernmental groups that 
the government cannot control”); In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000) 
(granting asylum to an applicant facing a likelihood of intra-family abuse that the 
government would refuse to prevent and noting that “even if the respondent had turned to 
the government for help, Moroccan authorities would have been unable or unwilling to 
control her father’s conduct”). 
  I found the use of experts especially helpful in preparing a claim for a young gay 
man from Albania whose father had threatened to kill him when his homosexuality was 
discovered.  Aside from that threat of death, there was no government-sponsored 
persecution of any kind.  Upon interviewing experts, I submitted expert affidavits explaining 
the historical and cultural circumstances surrounding domestic violence in Albania and the 
complete abnegation of government or police involvement in intra-family (as well as inter-
family) disputes, no matter how violent.  These affidavits helped establish the severity of my 
client’s death threat and the certainty with which the threat would be carried out if the young 
man was returned home.  The asylum petition was granted. 
  Because particular social group status has been extended to gays and lesbians (and, 
as discussed above, many, if not all, transgender persons), LGBT persons often fare better in 
bringing domestic violence asylum claims than victims of spousal abuse.  This stems from 
the fact that women (the vast majority of such victims) are not per se considered a particular 
social group.  U.S. immigration authorities have considered correcting this problem, but the 
issue remains unresolved.  The BIA has issued contrary decisions on the issue of domestic-
violence persecution.  Compare In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1329 (granting asylum to 
Moroccan applicant who faced “physical and emotional abuse” by her father on account of 
religious differences and whom government authorities would have refused to protect), with 
In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (Att’y Gen. 
2001) (denying asylum to Guatemalan woman who was repeatedly physically, mentally, and 
sexually abused by her husband).  Upon vacating the decision in R-A-, former Attorney 
General Reno proposed regulations that would have allowed victims of spousal abuse to 
seek asylum purely on that basis, see Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Proposed 
Rule Issued for Gender-Based Asylum Claims (Dec. 7, 2000), available at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/Gender.htm, but no action was taken on 
those proposals.  Former Attorney General Ashcroft was considering similar proposals.  See 
Rachel L. Swarns, Ashcroft Weighs the Granting of Political Asylum to Abused Women, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at A20. 
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identity theory as opposed to a standard sexual-orientation-based claim.  Of 
course, attorneys should not try to persuade such clients to identify as gay 
or lesbian simply to take advantage of more auspicious case law.123  
Fortunately, the imputed gay identity theory utilizes favorable precedent all 
the while depicting the client accurately and in accordance with his or her 
wishes.  The doctrine of imputed gay identity is therefore a viable avenue 
of relief for transgender asylum applicants who are persecuted because they 
are perceived to be gay or lesbian.  It accords with the reality that, in many 
cultures from which asylum seekers flee, persecutors might erroneously 
perceive their victims to be homosexual, regardless of their actual gender 
or sexual orientation.  The doctrine also pays tribute to the numerous ways 
in which gender and sexual orientation interrelate in culture. 
CONCLUSION 
Given recent developments in asylum law, transgender litigants can 
advance three separate theories for bringing a successful claim.  They can 
focus on the ways that their transgender identity falls under the various 
applicable standards for particular social group; they can bring a claim 
under the doctrine of imputed gay identity; and they can take advantage of 
recent Ninth Circuit case law that has extended protection to transgender 
litigants. 
The emerging case law in this arena is not perfect.  One drawback is the 
one-sidedness of the Ninth Circuit’s rulings, which fail (at least for now) to 
protect female-to-male transgender persons.  Some scholars might object 
that a soft immutability standard fails to adequately protect performative 
characteristics and that the only way to truly protect all transgender 
individuals is to jettison immutability altogether.  But these shortcomings 
should not overshadow the theoretical, doctrinal, and practical 
developments that have redounded to the benefit of many LGBT asylum 
seekers.  Indeed, the receptivity of asylum law to the claims of LGBT 
asylum seekers, coupled with the soft immutability standard, suggests great 
promise, and serves as a lodestar for LGBT litigants in other statutory and 
constitutional contexts. 
 
 
 123. And, in any event, problems can arise during IJ hearings if the asylum seeker 
disclaims the very identity asserted in briefs during direct or cross-examination. 
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